标签档案: policy

在 75, 印度对克什米尔的挑战改变了外交政策的重点

在 75, 印度对克什米尔的挑战改变了外交政策的重点
在喜马拉雅山高处, 美丽的克什米尔领土在塑造印度的外交政策方面发挥了关键作用, 自从两国从英国殖民统治下独立以来,它与巴基斯坦就该地区的主权进行了两次战争

几十年来, 印度试图阻止 巴基斯坦 在克什米尔旷日持久的争端中, 两国都声称拥有主权的美丽喜马拉雅领土,但在他们之间被瓜分.

这种无情的竞争使巴基斯坦一直是新德里外交政策的焦点.

但近两年, 自从印度和中国士兵在克什米尔拉达克地区发生致命的边境冲突以来, 政策制定者在 新德里 越来越多地把注意力转向 北京, 国家庆祝政策的重大转变 75 独立多年.

印度不断增长的经济, 现在比巴基斯坦大得多, 再加上北京日益自信地推动在亚洲的影响力, 意味着“新德里越来越以北京为中心,”中尉说. 创. D.S. 胡达, 谁来自 2014 至 2016 领导印度军队的北方司令部, 控制克什米尔, 包括拉达克.

克什米尔遭受叛乱, 自从印度和巴基斯坦从英国殖民统治下获得独立以来的封锁和政治诡计 1947, 并且一直处于印度与巴基斯坦和中国进行的四场战争中的两场的核心. 这三个国家’ 紧张的边界在争议领土相遇, 在世界上唯一的三向核对抗中.

从 1960 年代开始, 印度是不结盟运动的积极成员, 一组以上 100 冷战期间理论上不与任何大国结盟的国家. 尽管与邻国巴基斯坦和中国发生争执, 印度的不结盟立场仍然是其外交政策的基石, 其外交官主要专注于颠覆巴基斯坦对克什米尔的主张.

“克什米尔在某种程度上是我们外交政策关注的核心,”坎瓦尔·西巴尔说, 一位职业外交官,曾任印度外交大臣 2002-2003.

但目前印度和中国之间在拉达克有争议的边界问题上的军事对峙引发了这两个亚洲大国之间的紧张局势的严重升级. 尽管 17 多轮外交和军事会谈, 紧张的对峙仍在继续.

几十年来, 印度认为中国不构成军事威胁, 胡达说, 前军事指挥官. 但这种情况在 2020 年年中发生了变化,当时拉达克加勒万山谷喀喇昆仑山脉的一场冲突引发了军事紧张局势.

“加勒万代表了一个战略转折点,”康斯坦丁·泽维尔说, 社会和经济进步中心研究员, 一个位于新德里的政策小组. 它“帮助印度就重新调整与中国的整个关系的必要性达成了新的共识, 而不仅仅是解决边界问题。”

双方士兵用石头打了一场中世纪式的战斗, 拳头和棍棒, 至少离开 20 印度和四名中国士兵死亡.

一年前,印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪领导的印度教民族主义政府剥夺了克什米尔的国家地位, 取消了它的半自治, 并打压当地政客, 记者和通讯.

政府还将穆斯林占多数的地区划分为两个联邦政府管理的领土——拉达克和查谟-克什米尔——并终止了对土地和就业的继承保护.

政府坚称这些举措只涉及行政改革, 长期以来印度教民族主义承诺将绝大多数穆斯林克什米尔同化到该国的一部分.

巴基斯坦对印度的变化做出了愤怒的反应, 声称克什米尔是一个国际争端,任何单方面改变其地位的行为都违反了国际法和联合国. 该地区的决议.

但新德里在克什米尔行动的主要外交挑战来自一个意想不到的对手: 中国.

北京严厉批评新德里,并在联合国安理会提出这个问题, 讨论克什米尔争端的地方 — 再次不确定 — 近五年来的第一次.

印度的论点保持一致: 对国际社会,它坚称克什米尔是与巴基斯坦的双边问题. 它向巴基斯坦重申,克什米尔是印度的内政. 对当地的批评者, 它顽固地声称克什米尔是恐怖主义和法律与秩序的问题.

最初, 新德里在其控制的克什米尔地区面临着一场基本上和平的反印度运动. 然而, a crackdown on dissent led to a full-blown armed rebellion against Indian control in 1989. A protracted conflict since then has led to tens of thousands of deaths in the region.

Kashmir turned into a potential nuclear flashpoint as India and Pakistan became nuclear-armed states in 1998. Their standoff attracted global attention, with then-U.S. President Bill Clinton describing Kashmir as “the most dangerous place in the world.”

Many Indian foreign policy experts believe New Delhi was successful over the decades in blocking foreign pressure for change in Kashmir, despite deep sentiment against Indian rule in the region.

现在, New Delhi policymakers face the fundamental challenge of a China that is exerting more power in Asia and supporting Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir.

Pakistan “now operates in a more complicated political role as a partner of Chinese power,” said Paul Staniland, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago. “This gives it some clout and influence.”

With geopolitical rivalries deepening in the extended region, Kashmiris have been largely silenced, with their civil liberties curbed, as India has displayed zero tolerance for any form of dissent.

China’s rise as a global power has also pushed India closer to the U.S. and to the Quad, a new Indo-Pacific strategic alliance among the U.S., 印度, Australia and Japan that accuses Beijing of economic coercion and military maneuvering in the region upsetting the status quo.

India’s old nonaligned stance, rooted in the Cold War era when rivalries were playing out thousands of miles (公里) from its borders, has come to an end. The entire region has become a focus of geostrategic competition and great power rivalry close to India’s borders.

“We recognize the need to hedge against China to curb its ambitions by making it known that there is a new line of security that is being built against any aggressiveness by China, which is at the core of the Quad,” said Sibal, the former diplomat.

With the Quad now central to discussions among India’s strategic thinkers, New Delhi has massively ramped up infrastructure along its long, treacherous and undemarcated border with China. Beijing views the Quad as an attempt to contain its economic growth and influence.

“This is how we are sending a signal to China that we are ready to join with others to curb you,” Sibal said.

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